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COPING WITH THE FRAGMENTATION OF THE EURO AREA 
BANKING SYSTEM AND THE REAL CRISIS
THE IMPOSSIBLE CHALLENGE OF THE ECB ALONE
The financial turmoil resulting from the subprime crisis and then the
European sovereign debt crisis have weakened the euro zone’s banks and the
state of public finances, creating a vicious circle in which the banking and debt
crises have been mutually reinforcing (Shambaugh, 2012). This was followed by
an unprecedented loss of confidence that caused a double liquidity crisis: first in
September 2008, following the fall of Lehman Brothers, and then at the end of
2011 due to the European debt crisis. Despite the many common rules1 applied
by the Member States on financial regulation and a common framework for
competition and freedom of establishment, the banking and financial system,
which seemed to be increasingly integrated2, has fragmented. 
Fragmentation of the European banking system has had strong
consequences. First, beyond the European deposit guarantee, one euro in a
Portuguese bank could not be substituted with one euro in a German bank, for
Portuguese and German banks did not support the same default risk. It led to a
reduction in the optimality of the euro zone. Second, fragmentation meant
increased spreads between European domestic interest rates, which paved the way
for a modification in the transmission of the European central bank (ECB) single
monetary policy. The pass-through of conventional monetary policies no longer
worked in distressed economies where monetary conditions were increasingly
influenced by the level of debts, public and private, or by the market perception of
unsustainability. The single monetary policy then aggravated the divergence
between the core and the periphery: low rates for main refinancing operations
reduced core countries rates, but not that of the periphery. Consequently the ECB
tried to counter this phenomenon by repeatedly proposing various
unconventional measures, prioritizing support for the banking system due to the
key role it plays in financing non-financial agents in the Eurozone. In addition, a
large-scale institutional change has started taking place with the on-going
establishment of a banking union designed to supervise the euro zone’s systemic
banks and to propose resolution mechanisms to cope with future bank failures.
This chapter provides an overview of the fragmentation of banking system in
the euro zone. It discusses the measures taken by the ECB to deal with this,
including the banking union. The chapter highlights the shortcomings of a
European strategy which would exclusively rely on the ECB to save the euro.
A stronger coordination, first between the ECB and national bank supervisors
and, second between the ECB and national governments, is called for in order
1. Rules resulting from the transposition of European directives, themselves usually inspired by the
recommendations of the Basel Committee.
2. The numerous reports written on European financial integration indeed showed that while the
interbank markets were highly integrated, this was not the case of retail banking (see for example
Jappelli and Pagano, 2008).
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not only to escape a new range of bank failures but also to resolve the current
economic crisis. Consequently, two proposals are made: first, a special
banking fund is discussed to address the too-important-to-fail (TITF) banks
which, under the on-going banking union, will draw on national backstops,
hence on bail-outs; second, the launch of a policy mix is advocated, with a
fiscal investment package financed by European Investment Bank (EIB) bond
issuance and ECB purchases.
1. The fragmentation of the Eurozone banking system
The banking system in the euro zone has been hit hard by the dual crisis that
has afflicted Europe since 2007: first, the subprime crisis and then the sovereign
debt crisis. The first caused heavy losses related to the holding of toxic assets. This
forced central banks to take exceptional measures (see below) and governments
to set up plans to bail out their banking systems in late 2008. Tensions on the
interbank markets significantly eased, as was seen in changes in the difference
between the Euribor and Eurepo3 interbank rates (Figure 1). However, the
interbank market never returned to the way it functioned before the crisis,
and tensions peaked anew in mid-2011 in conjunction with the sovereign debt
crisis in the euro zone. Indeed, the banks’ exposure to sovereign risk threatened
their solvency and plunged the euro zone into a vicious circle in which banking
and fiscal problems became mutually reinforcing in some countries. It remains
that since the sovereign debt crisis was mainly confined to Greece, spreads in the
interbank market remained well below the peak seen during the fall of Lehman
3. The Euribor rate represents the price of an interbank loan without collateral for a given term.
The Eurepo rate is the price of an interbank loan with collateral for the same term.
Figure 1. Difference between the Euribor rate and the Eurepo rate
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Source: Datastream.
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Brothers. The gradual decline in the prices of Italian and Spanish bonds neverthe-
less increased the risk of a new systemic crisis, engendering further tensions on the
interbank markets from mid-2011. In order to ensure that these tensions did not
give rise to a major systemic crisis, the ECB decided to intervene again and
granted financing for an exceptional period of three years. The ECB thus covered
most of the financing needs of the Spanish and Italian banks, which were no
longer able to raise funds on the interbank market or the bond market.
While this meant that the banking crisis was contained, it was certainly
not resolved. Indeed, a dichotomy has emerged between the countries at the
heart of the European Union (Germany, France4, Netherlands, Belgium and
Finland) and those experiencing a crisis in their public finances (Greece, Portugal,
Ireland, Spain and Italy). In the bond markets, this has resulted in a reallocation of
investor portfolios to the detriment of the countries at risk. The purchase of
government bonds issued by countries considered safer has been favoured, which
has had the effect of causing significant losses for banks exposed to sovereign risk,
i.e. mainly those from the countries in crisis. Their increasingly fragile situation led
them to be deprived of liquidity in the interbank market. Banks in the core
countries possessed cash and preferred to leave it on deposit with the ECB.
Without market financing, the banks in the countries in crisis turned to the ECB
via its various monetary policy operations. Consequently the ECB has replaced
the market and has been implicitly taking on the risk that interbank market
players no longer wish to bear. This has resulted in a very significant increase in
TARGET balances (Figure 2), which measure the debtor or creditor positions of the
national central banks, and thus the commercial banks vis-à-vis the ECB.
4. France can be considered one of the Union’s core countries. Nevertheless, with regard to the
TARGET balances, French banks are slightly in debt, but not at all on the same scale as the Spanish
and Italian banks.
Figure 2. TARGET balances
       In bn euros
Source: Eurocrisis monitor, Osnabrück Universität.
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The crisis has in fact severely disrupted the functioning of the interbank
market, which had previously appeared highly integrated. Credit flows and cross-
border deposits between monetary and financial institutions (MFIs) in the euro
zone have contracted sharply. As far as banks’ bilateral consolidated foreign claims
are concerned, Bouvatier and Delatte (2014) show that banking integration has
reversed in the euro zone, in contrast with what happened in non-euro zone
banks where banking integration has strengthened since the financial crisis.
The change in credit conditions as measured by the ECB’s Bank Lending
Survey (BLS) clearly reflects the tightening of credit conditions in Spain at the
beginning of the crisis, in line with the crash in the real estate market, as well as in
Italy, where restrictions on the supply of credit to households and businesses
peaked in late 2011 and early 2012 (Figures 3 and 4). These observations are in
line with the influential work of Jiménez, Ongena, Peydro and Saurina (2012).
Using a microeconomic database on bank behaviour, these authors show that the
probability that a Spanish bank will refuse credit to non-financial corporations
increases in a deteriorating economic environment (tightening of monetary policy
or reduced growth) and that this effect is even stronger when the banks are
weakly capitalized or not very liquid.
Another dimension of fragmentation involves the sharp increase in the disper-
sion of bank rates in the euro zone since 2007. This can be seen in the changes in
interest rates on loans to non-financial corporations (Figure 5) in the euro zone
since the crisis, as well as in the interquartile differences calculated for the rates
charged on loans (to euro zone households or non-financials, see Figure 6) and
deposits (Figure 7).             
Figure 3. Credit conditions applied to enterprises
Note: The curves for each country represent the difference between establishments reporting that they
have tightened their credit conditions and those reporting that they have been eased. Therefore a rise
reflects tighter credit conditions.
Source: ECB (Bank Lending Survey).
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Figure 4. Credit conditions applied to households (for house purchase)
Note: The curves for each country represent the difference between establishments reporting that they
have tightened their credit conditions and those reporting that they have been eased. Therefore a rise
reflects tighter credit conditions.
Source: ECB (Bank Lending Survey).
Figure 5. Interest rates on new lending to non-financial corporations 
(1 to 5 year term)
In %
Source: ECB.
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Figure 6. Dispersion of interest rates on bank credits
In percentage points                                                                                                                                  In %
Source: ECB. Interquartile difference.
Figure 7. Dispersion of interest rates on bank deposits
In percentage points
Source: ECB. Interquartile difference.
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A heterogeneity that impacts transmission of monetary policy
Achieving uniformity in the transmission of the ECB’s monetary policy in
all the Member States is central to ensure the viability of the monetary
union. There were already significant differences in the transmission of monetary
policy prior to the crisis (Arnold & van Ewijk, 2014; Sorensen & Werner, 2006),
although a trend toward greater uniformity had been observed (Vajanne 2007;
Blot & Labondance, 2013). Note, however, that this conclusion depends heavily
on the markets surveyed and their level of legal integration and competition (de
Graeve, de Jonghe, & van der Vennet, 2007). Homogenization appears clearly in
the transmission of monetary policy on the rates charged to business. Transmis-
sion is more heterogeneous on other markets where national characteristics
associated with legal systems and popular customs are still essential to setting
bank rates (Mojon, 2000; Giuliodori, 2005), like markets for mortgage and
consumer loans. 
The trend towards uniformity in the transmission of monetary policy
throughout the euro zone came to a halt with the crisis, and the convergence
of bank interest rates has even reversed [(Arnold & van Ewijk, 2014),(Belke,
Beckmann, & Verbeyen, 2013),(Karagianis, Panagopoulos, and Vlamis, 2010),
(Rughoo & Sarantis, 2014)]. 
The fragmenting transmission of monetary policy is weakening the euro
zone because it reduces the effectiveness of the ECB's single monetary policy if it
leads to strengthening economic divergences, when, for instance, expansionary
monetary policy does not produce lower interest rates on the loans of the periph-
eral countries. In the following, we intend to show that fragmentation is not only
due to economic fundamentals but also to heterogeneous self-sustaining
dynamics. To explore this point, we propose estimating the following equation in
an effort to explain the nominal interest rates applied by the banks rbi,t in each
Member State i at time t. Here we present the results for interest rates on 1 to
5-year loans to non-financial corporations (NFCs) and for two types of loans to
households: real estate loans and consumer loans.
rbi,t = αi + β.timei + γ.primei,t + δ.rmt + ρ.CISSt + εt
These interest rates are explained by the money market rates rmt which reflect
the ECB’s conventional monetary policy. Here we take the overnight rate (Eonia).
In addition, we include a variable reflecting the risk premium associated with each
Member State (primei,t), calculated as the difference between the long-term rates
on government bonds and the money market rates. To take account of the exac-
erbation of risk aversion since the crisis, we also include an indicator of financial
stress: the Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress (CISS) developed by the ECB
(Hollo et al., 2012).
Panel estimates are implemented on two sub-samples of the euro zone: one
for the core countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, France and the
Netherlands) and the other for those in the periphery (Spain, Greece, Ireland, Italy
and Portugal). We include country fixed effects, and we include a time trend timei
that measures the temporal effect that is not related to the fundamentals included
in the model. Finally, we estimate these panels for two sub-periods: before and
after the crisis.
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Results are reported in table 1. Looking at the rates for NFCs, we find that
before the crisis the determinants of these rates were relatively similar in the
countries of the core and the periphery. Monetary policy was a little more influen-
tial in the peripheral countries, but for the rest, the coefficients were very close.
Note in particular the downward trend in rates for both groups of countries iden-
tified by the timei variable. This result indicates that, independently of the model’s
fundamentals, there is a trend for bank rates to fall in the euro zone. Before the
crisis, there was a trend towards setting relatively homogeneous interest
rates for loans to NFCs in the euro zone.
The results since the crisis point towards a different dynamic, with
increasingly clear fragmentation. While the transmission of monetary policy
remains at an equivalent level in the core countries, it diminishes sharply for
countries in the periphery. Furthermore, while the variable that takes into
account the risk premium applied to each Member State is no longer significant
for the core countries, it still is for the periphery countries. However, this is a
period during which rate spreads were increasing for these countries, indicating
that tensions on the bond markets are affecting the rates charged by banks.
Likewise, the financial stress indicator still has a positive, significant effect, but the
coefficient is twice as high for the countries of the periphery. Finally, it is inter-
esting to note the results of the time variable. For the core countries, this variable
has not been significant since the crisis, indicating that the establishment of bank
rates does reflect the fundamentals included in the estimates. For the periphery,
this variable has become positive since the crisis: in addition to the other determi-
nants included in the equation, an upward trend in bank rates can be seen in the
peripheral countries. This result highlights the process of divergence between the
two groups of countries. The peripheral countries have suffered a hike in bank
rates independently of the fundamentals, a situation that is not seen in the core
countries. This post-crisis trend towards differentiation can also be seen when
looking at the establishment of bank rates for households, whether for real estate
loans or consumer loans. This observation is confirmed (Table 2) by taking into
account non-conventional measures where, rather than the EONIA we introduce
an implicit monetary policy rate5 (or “shadow rate”). Since the crisis, there has
been noticeable fragmentation between the core and the periphery.
The ECB is thus facing a dual challenge. First, it has to bring inflation back to
its target. The fight against the risk of deflation is thus becoming central to the
implementation of monetary policy. Second, the measures taken by the ECB also
has to aim at reducing the fragmentation of the European banking system so as to
restore homogeneity in the transmission of monetary policy within the euro zone
(Cour-Thimman & Winkler, 2013).
5. The calculation of an implicit monetary policy rate can be used to translate the unconventional
measures taken by the central banks. The implicit rate can thus be negative. See Wu and Xia (2014)
for an illustration. 
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Table 1. Determinants of bank interest rates before and after the crisis 
 NFC Property Consumer
 Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis
  Core Periph Core Periph Core Periph Core Periph Core Periph Core Periph
Eonia 0.74*** 0.88*** 0.72*** 0.39*** 0.43*** 0.87*** 0.15*** 0.49*** 0.68*** 0.28*** 0.01 -0.50**
 [0.03] [0.02] [0.04] [0.09] [0.05] [0.03] [0.05] [0.09] [0.06] [0.09] [0.17] [0.22]
Prime 0.21*** 0.16*** 0.00 0.07*** 0.20*** 0.13*** 0.11*** -0.03** 0.31*** 0.01 -0.13 0.04
 [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.01] [0.06] [0.04] [0.03] [0.01] [0.07] [0.13] [0.12] [0.03]
Ciss 0.33*** 0.35*** 0.15*** 0.27*** 0.24*** 0.35*** 0.15*** 0.30*** 0.28*** 0.30*** 0.19*** 0.43***
 [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.06] [0.06] [0.08]
Time -0.01*** -0.01*** 0.00 0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.00 -0.01*** 0.00 0.00 0.02***
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00]
Constant 3.30*** 2.51*** 2.61*** -0.13 5.04*** 3.07*** 4.39*** 2.88*** 4.58*** 8.36*** 5.44*** 6.64***
 [0.14] [0.13] [0.24] [0.30] [0.27] [0.17] [0.30] [0.29] [0.33] [0.60] [1.07] [0.75]
N 387 288 402 268 432 288 402 268 459 288 335 201
r2 0.89 0.97 0.80 0.46 0.35 0.93 0.73 0.64 0.69 0.28 0.05 0.16
Data source: ECB & Eurostat, authors' estimates.
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Table 2. Determinants of bank interest rates before and after the crisis 
 NFC Property Consumer
 Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis
  Core Periph Core Periph Core Periph Core Periph Core Periph Core Periph
Shadow 0.52*** 0.62*** 0.24*** 0.11*** 0.29*** 0.60*** 0.02 0.10** 0.52*** 0.19** -0.12 -0.47***
 [0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.02] [0.04] [0.05] [0.09] [0.08] [0.10]
Prime 0.07 0.01 -0.06 0.08*** 0.12 -0.03 0.09*** -0.01 0.16** -0.08 -0.14 0.01
 [0.04] [0.05] [0.03] [0.01] [0.06] [0.05] [0.03] [0.01] [0.07] [0.13] [0.12] [0.03]
Ciss 0.42*** 0.47*** 0.27*** 0.33*** 0.30*** 0.47*** 0.17*** 0.37*** 0.38*** 0.35*** 0.16** 0.29***
 [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.06] [0.06] [0.08]
Time -0.01*** -0.00*** -0.00 0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.00 -0.01*** -0.00 -0.00 0.01**
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00]
Constant 4.04*** 3.35*** 3.13*** -0.05 5.48*** 3.92*** 4.61*** 3.13*** 5.48*** 8.85*** 5.96*** 7.57***
 [0.17] [0.18] [0.30] [0.32] [0.26] [0.21] [0.31] [0.32] [0.30] [0.54] [1.06] [0.75]
N 387 288 402 268 432 288 402 268 459 288 335 201
r2 0.83 0.93 0.70 0.44 0.31 0.87 0.72 0.61 0.67 0.27 0.06 0.23
Data source: ECB & Eurostat, authors' estimates.
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2. The ECB and unconventional monetary policy measures 
as a last resort?
The results reported in the previous section have shown that monetary
policy does not share the same degree of effectiveness in the core and the
peripheral countries: it may still be effective in the first but not in the latter.
It thus questions the ability of the ECB to manage the euro area crisis on
its own.
The gloomy economic situation in the euro zone, with its deflationary risks,
brought the European Central Bank (ECB) to undertake a round of quantitative
easing. These measures, some of which may demand that the ECB take on risk –
via the acquisition of securitization products, i.e. Asset Backed Securities (ABS) –
are controversial. Some economists, such as Hans-Werner Sinn, criticize the
ECB: in their view, it is exceeding its mandate for price stability by subjecting
the European economies to a risk of inflation due to excess liquidity that it has
put into circulation. Other economists, such as Michel Aglietta, believe instead
that the ECB is providing an appropriate response to Europe’s economic
situation within the given institutional framework. They even regret the
slowness of its response and are pushing for an institutional change to give the
ECB a plurality of objectives, including price stability, growth and financial
stability (Blot et al., 2014) or price stability, financial stability and a sustainable
public debt (Aglietta, 2014).
After having reviewed the recent unconventional measures implemented by
the ECB, we review the effectiveness of these measures. We conclude on the chal-
lenges of ECB policies in the longer run and discuss the usefulness of a change in
the statutes of the ECB.
Comparison of the monetary policy measures taken by the ECB, 
the Bank of England and the Fed
The major central banks have resorted to various measures, both conven-
tional and unconventional, that have resulted in increasing and / or changing the
size and composition of their balance sheets. There are nevertheless important
differences in the nature of the measures preferred by the ECB, the Federal
Reserve and the Bank of England. These differences result in large part from the
financial structure of the economies in question. The ECB has for instance
focused on supporting the banking system because of its major role in financing
non-financial agents. In the United States, where market financing is predomi-
nant, the Federal Reserve has instead sought to influence market prices through
the purchase of securities. The fact remains that increasing the size of the balance
sheet is still an imperfect way to take account of the additional monetary
stimulus resulting from the unconventional measures implemented. There have
been recent efforts to determine an equivalent of these actions in terms of key
interest rates, called an implicit rate or shadow rate. Wu and Xia (2014) propose
an approach that is based on the rate curve and thus calculate the implicit rate of
the monetary policy of the ECB, the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England.
Doing this shows that the ECB has indeed conducted a more expansionary
monetary policy (Figure 8) through unconventional measures than what the
main refinancing operations rate shows, as the implicit rate is negative. However,
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the ECB’s policy has been relatively less expansionary than that of the Bank
of England and the US Federal Reserve.
The monetary policies of the major central banks have consisted in lending
directly to the banks (against high-quality collateral) and intervening in the
financial markets (mainly government securities but also securities backed by real
estate assets, and non-financial commercial paper). Several types of interventions
have been endorsed:
• On the one hand, the Fed and the Bank of England decided to intervene,
as a first step, mainly through (conventional) loans to banks facing liquidity
problems. In a second step, these central banks engaged in purchases of securities
on the markets to lower long-term interest rates and stimulate the economy. For
example, the Federal Reserve established programmes for purchasing US govern-
ment debt (the first was launched in March 2009) and mortgage-backed
securities. In June 2014, the securities portfolio of the Federal Reserve came to
about 4000 billion dollars, or about 90% of its balance sheet (Figure 9). Likewise,
in January 2009 the Bank of England set up the Asset Purchase Facility, a very
large-scale programme to purchase British government securities and to a lesser
extent Treasury bills and corporate bonds. In July 2012, this had reached a level of
GBP 375 billion, or 90% of the BoE’s assets (Figure 10).
• On the other hand, most of the ECB’s efforts have relied on collateralized
loans (i.e. against guarantees) to the banking sector. Since October 2008,
auctions for monetary policy transactions have been conducted at fixed rates with
full allocation for demands for bank refinancing. In other words, so long as suffi-
cient collateral is provided, any demand for bank liquidity is met. This policy is
thus entirely dependent on the demand for liquidity coming from commercial
banks, and thereby breaks with the previous policy of a limited supply of liquidity
to banks. Though new, this policy is not quite unconventional, insofar as it does
Figure 8. Shadow rates of monetary policy 
In %
Source: Wu & Xia (2014), http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/jing.wu/research/data/WX.html.
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not increase the size of the commercial banks’ excess reserves, or the risk borne by
the ECB.6 Furthermore, the ECB implemented unconventional measures when it
decided to increase the maximum maturity of its loans (initially 3 months), with
one-year operations carried out in June, September and December 2009 (LTRO)
and three-year operations in December 2011 and February 2012 (VLTRO). The
ECB has also created programmes to purchase securities: (i) secured bank bond
purchases (called “covered bond purchase programmes”, CBPP) in June 2009 and
CBPP2 in November 2011 were designed as a further way of dealing with banks’
financing costs, which were considered too high and thus incompatible with the
orientation of monetary policy; (ii) the Securities Markets Programme (SMP) was
launched in May 2010 to engage in the limited purchase of government debt on
secondary markets, sums that were supposedly sterilized by the ECB; the SMP was
designed as a response to the pressure on sovereign debt markets, which called
into question the smooth transmission of monetary policy in the euro zone; (iii)
Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), a new programme of buying sovereign
bonds, starting in August and September 2012, which is intended to limit what
are considered excessive risk premiums on certain sovereign debt bonds; (iv)
finally, facing a growing risk of deflation in the euro zone, the ECB decided on 4
September 2014 to implement a new programme to purchase the debt securities
of European companies and residential real estate loans (Asset-Backed Securities
Purchase Programme, ABSPP) and a new programme for purchasing secured bank
bonds (CBPP3), with the aim of freeing commercial bank balance sheets of these
debts and thereby encouraging them to lend to businesses, in particular SMEs.  
6. It must be acknowledged that risk has somewhat increased to the extent that collateral
eligibility requirements are reduced.
Figure 9. Composition of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet assets
In billion dollars
Source: Federal Reserve (Flow of Funds).
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The multiplicity of the ECB's purchasing interventions should not mask
the fact that its programmes remained limited in scale: 50 billion euros for the
CBPP and CBPP2,  162,5 billion euros for the SMP (as stated in the initial
announcement)7, an unlimited but unused amount for OMTs and unspecified
amounts for ABSPP and CBPP3, compared with about 1 trillion euros for the two
long-term lending operations (LTRO), which contributed greatly to increasing the
size of the ECB’s balance sheet (Figure 11). It follows that the ECB has done more
to relieve commercial banks than to directly support or revive financial market
activities.
The differences in technique between the central bank interventions reflect
particular legal and economic factors – legal, because EU treaties prohibit the ECB
from buying sovereign bonds on the primary market, and economic, as central
banks seek to affect financing conditions as efficiently as possible. In the euro
zone, banks provide the bulk of financing for private sector activity, which is why
the ECB intervenes mainly by lending to the banking sector. Conversely, finance
for the US economy is more disintermediated, which explains the scale of the
Fed’s securities purchases.
A much-discussed unconventional monetary policy involves influencing
expectations through the announcement of policy in advance (conventional or
unconventional). This policy of “forward guidance” (formerly called “open-mouth
operations”) consists of announcing that the central bank benchmark rate will not
be cut until the unemployment rate falls below 7% of the working population (as
did the Bank of England from the summer of 2013) or of announcing an
unlimited conditional buyback of sovereign debt (up to a maturity of 3 years) to
contain the upward pressure on the yields on government bonds (this was the
Figure 10. Composition of the Bank of England’s balance sheet assets
   In billion British pounds sterling
Source: Bank of England.
7. The maximum amount allocated to SMP was 219 billion euros in January-February 2012.
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case of the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions programme, launched in the
summer of 2012, and up to now never used).
On the effectiveness of ECB unconventional monetary policy
The ECB objectives are easily circumscribed within the European framework.
The Treaty on the European Union requires that the ECB prioritize the pursuit of
price stability. In addition, without detriment to this objective, the ECB shall
pursue policies that are consistent with the objectives of the European Union,
which include in particular the search for high growth that does not generate
inflationary pressures. The effectiveness of the ECB’s monetary policy can thus be
judged by these two objectives: price stability and, once that is achieved,
economic growth. To achieve these objectives, the ECB must ensure that the
channels for transmitting its policy towards the banks and financial markets
function properly.
Hitherto, unconventional measures were introduced officially in order to
restore the channels for transmitting the ECB’s monetary policy to the real
economy – the very channels that in some euro zone countries had been
damaged by the financial crisis and the euro crisis. 
Numerous articles have dealt with the ECB’s monetary policy since the start
of the crisis. Creel, Hubert and Viennot (2013) offer a summary (see the Table on
p. 26 of their paper), which concludes that in general the interest rate channel
worked, whereas the credit channel did not have the expected effects of trans-
mission. The recent results of Altavilla, Giannone and Lenza (2014) nuance these
findings to some extent, by showing that the announcement of the OMT
programme led to lowering the two-year sovereign rates of Italy and Spain,
without any effect on German and French sovereign yields. Using a multi-
country VAR model linking the macroeconomic and financial variables, they
Figure 11. Composition of the ECB’s balance sheet assets
In billion euros
Source: ECB.
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show that these OMT announcements may have had a significant impact on the
level of economic activity, lending and prices in Spain and Italy: for instance, the
simple announcement of the unconventional policy could have improved the
transmission of conventional monetary policy to the macroeconomic and
financial variables.
Following this work, Creel, Hubert and Viennot (2013) examined the effec-
tiveness of the ECB’s conventional and unconventional policies during the
financial crisis in four countries (France, Germany, Italy and Spain). They
estimated the impact of the conventional instrument and the purchases of securi-
ties under the ECB’s unconventional policies (those classified as “Securities held
for monetary policy purposes”) on interest rates and on the volume of new loans
made in different markets: loans to non-financial corporations, to households, the
sovereign debt market, and the money market. They show (see table 3) that
unconventional policies have led to lowering interest rates on the money market,
on government securities and on loans to non-financial corporations. These
policies, however, have had no effect on the volume of lending. At the same time,
it turns out that the conventional instrument, whose lack of effectiveness was one
of the justifications for the use of unconventional measures, had the expected
effect on virtually all the markets surveyed – more so in the South of the euro zone
than in the North on the market for six-month sovereign bonds.
It seems therefore that unconventional policies have had a direct impact
on the sovereign bond market as well as indirect effects, by helping to
restore the effectiveness of the conventional instrument on other markets.
One of the reasons explaining the weak impact of both conventional and uncon-
ventional monetary instruments , on the volume of loans granted is the need for
commercial banks to deleverage and reduce the size of their balance sheet by
adjusting their portfolio of risk-weighted assets. This has pushed them to increase
their reserves rather than to play their intermediation role and to demand a rela-
tively higher return for exposure. Bank practices, though legitimate, hurt the
transmission of monetary policy: rates fall, but credit fails to take off. It is thus
important for monetary policy not to be based exclusively on the banking sector. 
In view of these results, it is interesting to note that the new wave of
unconventional operations discussed by the ECB since June 2014 has focused
more directly on the possible acquisition of sovereign bonds and the acquisi-
tion of corporate securities, which means bypassing the banking sector. This
workaround should hopefully strengthen the transmission of monetary policy to
the real economy, a result that would obviously be welcome to avoid the risk of
deflation in the euro zone.
As a matter of fact, on 5 June 2014, the ECB announced a series of measures,
including rate cuts and measures to boost the supply of loans. It is difficult to
estimate the direct impact on economic activity in the euro zone. It is also possible
that the (indirect) signalling effect of these measures can generate an improve-
ment in market conditions and confidence.
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Table 3. Panel data estimation of ECB monetary policies on interest rates and volumes
 Money market Sovereign bond mkts, maturity 6 mth
Sovereign bond mkts, 
maturity 5 yr
Sovereign bond mkts, 
maturity 10 yr
NFC loans, 
inf to 1 m€
NFC loans, 
sup to 1 m€
 rate volume rate volume rate volume rate volume rate volume rate volume
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)  (12) 
Conventional MP 0.33*** 2,16 0,02 -0.05* 0,21 0,06 -0,14 0,02 0.23*** -0,03 0.27*** -0.37*
 [0.06] [3.41] [0.29] [0.03] [0.47] [0.04] [0.42] [0.04] [0.06] [0.07] [0.10] [0.21]
Unconventional -0.01*** 0,15 -0,02 0,00 -0.03* 0,00 0,01 0,00 -0.01** -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.01*
MP [0.00] [0.13] [0.01] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01]
Lag rate -0,04  -0.51***  -0.48***  -0.50***  0.13**  -0.30***  
 [0.06]  [0.04]  [0.04]  [0.03]  [0.06]  [0.06]  
Lag volume  0.88***  0.31***  -0.19***  0.24***  0.40***  0.42***
  [0.03]  [0.06]  [0.05]  [0.06]  [0.05]  [0.06]
Volume 0,00  -0,66  0,06  1.13*  0,04  0.06**  
 [0.00]  [0.66]  [0.70]  [0.63]  [0.04]  [0.03]  
Rate  -1,20  0,01  -0,01  0.01***  0,04  0.35***
  [3.42]  [0.01]  [0.00]  [0.00]  [0.07]  [0.12]
CPI 0,02 0,87 0,00 -0.01** 0,05 -0.03*** 0,07 -0.02** 0,01 0.04*** 0,02 0.09***
 [0.01] [0.56] [0.05] [0.00] [0.07] [0.01] [0.07] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.04]
IP 0,00 0,12 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0.01*** -0.01**
 [0.00] [0.08] [0.01] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01]
CISS -0.50*** 4,46 -0,64 0,00 1.19** 0,02 0,24 -0.11* -0.20** 0.33*** -0.46*** 0.99***
 [0.09] [4.78] [0.41] [0.04] [0.60] [0.07] [0.59] [0.06] [0.09] [0.11] [0.16] [0.32]
Oil Price 0.00* 0,05 0,00 0,00 0.01** 0,00 0,01 0,00 -0.00* 0.00* 0,00 0,00
 [0.00] [0.04] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
STOXX 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Const. 0.06** -1,94 0.41** 0.13*** -0,15 0.31*** -0,07 0.14*** -0,01 0.24*** -0,04 0.66***
 [0.03] [1.48] [0.17] [0.02] [0.28] [0.02] [0.22] [0.02] [0.05] [0.04] [0.07] [0.13]
N 256 260 256 260 256 260 256 260 256 260 256 260
Standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The model is estimated with time and country fixed-effects robust to an AR(1) disturbance term.
Source: Creel, Hubert and Viennot (2013).
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• The ECB lowered the rates on its main refinancing operations (MRO) and
the deposit rate to 0.15% and -0.10% respectively. The marginal lending
rate was reduced to 0.40%. 
• A certain number of measures to strengthen liquidity have been announced:
the sterilization of the Securities Market Programme (SMP), which currently
takes up to 165 billion euros, will end; the fixed-rate financing operations
with full allotment8 (“fixed rate full allotment”) will be extended for at least
18 months, until the end of 2016; and the ECB will carry out a series of
targeted LTROs (TLTROs) on a horizon of over 2 years starting September
2014.
• The TLTROs will have a maturity of less than 4 years, and the initial alloca-
tion will be 7% of outstanding private sector loans, with access to additional
funds based on improvement in actual lending. This could increase access to
the liquidity of banks in the peripheral countries that are currently
deleveraging.
• The cost of these loans will be set at the rate of the MRO at the time of
purchase plus 0.10 points. By making available financing over 4 years at the
MRO + 0.10 point rate, the ECB is strengthening its forward guidance policy
by ensuring that rates will remain low for an extended period.
• In addition, Mr. Draghi has reported “an intensification of preparatory work
related to ABS purchases” to encourage the development of the market.
On 4 September 2014, slowing growth and the increasing risk of de-
anchoring inflationary expectations and drifting into deflation prompted the ECB
to lower its benchmark interest rate by 10 basis points and to announce the
purchase of private sector assets starting in October. The announcement rein-
forced the package of measures announced in June.
• The ECB cut its key interest rate by 0.10 point. The rate on the main refi-
nancing operations (MRO) is now 0.05% and the rate on deposit facilities -
0.20%. Mario Draghi noted that this reduction would make the upcoming
TLTRO operations more attractive.
• The ECB also announced a programme to purchase ABS (ABSPP) to
stimulate new credit flows to the real economy. The ABS programme will
include “simple and transparent” ABS purchases backed by underlying
assets consisting of claims on the non-financial private sector in the euro
zone. The programme will include residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS).
• In parallel, a covered bond purchase programme (CBPP3) was announced
that will target purchases of covered bonds issued by euro zone monetary
financial institutions.
• Mario Draghi also stated that a quantitative easing programme (referring to
purchases of sovereign bonds) was discussed.
These measures can be broken down into three groups based on their respec-
tive objectives: 
1.  Implicit tightening9 of the monetary policy stance, inducing as a reaction:
8. The ECB meets all the demands for liquidity made by the banking system.
9. Linked firstly to the reduction in the inflation rate, which is pushing up the real interest rate,
and secondly to the reduction in the size of bank balance sheets.
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i. Rate reductions,
ii. Injections of liquidity (end of SMP sterilization, LTRO, FRFA extension). 
2. Deterioration of the mechanisms for the transmission of monetary policy
(“via the channel of bank credit”), inducing as a reaction:
i. Targeted LTROs,
ii. Purchases of ABS and CBPP3. 
3. Increasing gap between inflation and the ECB target and the medium-term
economic outlook, inducing as a reaction:
i. Broad-based asset purchases.
What impact these measures are likely to have?
Rate reductions 
These measures operate through various channels, and their impact will
depend, in part, on the demand for credit. We believe that the direct impact of
these rate cuts will be relatively weak. The standard multipliers suggest an
impact of less than 0.1% on the euro zone’s GDP, although the signalling effect of
a negative deposit rate could have a slightly higher impact.
Injections of liquidity
The impact of the end of the SMP sterilization operation (which increases the
reserves of the central bank) will increase liquidity and thus could push the EONIA
rate towards the bottom of the interest rate corridor. But the effect is likely to be
limited, because the excess liquidity will decline if the banks continue to repay the
450 billion euros from the existing very long-term refinancing operations
(VLTROs). As the banks already have access to virtually unlimited ECB financing
and reimbursement, it is not very likely that new liquidity injections will have a
significant impact on the economy, in the context of the current corridor.
Targeted LTROs
The TLTROs could potentially have a significant effect. The TLTROs are
supposed to reduce banks’ financing costs significantly. Indeed, on average, 4-
year financing on the markets currently costs euro zone banks around 150 basis
points. It can be expected that the TLTROs will reduce this cost. However, even if
the banks use the TLTRO programme, it may not have the desired effect on
the mechanism for transmitting monetary policy, as the banks may use this
financing to buy government bonds or other assets rather than stimulating
the supply of loans to households and businesses. The fact that banks in the
euro zone are currently reimbursing the 2011 and 2012 VLTROs suggests that
there are barriers to lending today (mainly low demand for loans), even when
financing costs are low. The main difference between the VLTRO and TLTRO
though involves conditioning the provision of liquidity in the latter on an amount
of outstanding loans to the non-financial private sector (excluding mortgages),
based on what the Bank of England did with its Funding for Lending Scheme (FLS)
set up in summer 2012.
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ABS purchases and CBPP3
These new measures supplement the TLTRO programme, as these purchases
should allow substitution in the banks’ balance sheets in favour of lending to the
real economy. However, it is impossible at this stage to quantify the impact of
these announcements. The purchases of covered bonds began in October 2014,
while the ABS purchases will begin before the end of the year. The covered bond
spreads have narrowed in response to these announcements. The purchases will
continue for at least two years, but no details on their size have been given.
Estimates of the current size of the ABS market vary, but are around the 1,000
billion euro mark, about half of which is traded on the financial markets. A note by
Bruegel10 suggests that about 60% of the market is made up of RMBS. The quality
of outstanding ABS securities varies, and not all will be eligible for ECB purchases.
In addition, a large part of the existing shares are already used as collateral with
the ECB.
More specifically, Mario Draghi announced on 4 September 2014 that the
objective could be to raise the ECB’s balance sheet to its level of early 2012. To do
this would require increasing it from its current level by 1,000 billion euros. He did
not provide an estimate of the size of the two purchasing programmes. A recent
survey by Bloomberg estimated the TLTRO programme at 500 billion euros. But
an important part of the TLTRO could simply replace the financing for the refi-
nancing operations conducted in 2011-2012. This suggests that an asset
purchase programme of an additional 500 billion euros would be needed to
reach the target announced for the size of the ECB balance sheet.
“Broad-based asset purchases” (in the ECB’s language: QE and 
the purchase of sovereign bonds) 
It seems doubtful that the combination of TLTRO programmes and purchases
of ABS and covered bonds would enable the ECB to achieve half or more of the
1,000 billion euros of net expansion in the size of its balance sheet. The first
tranche of the TLTRO programme has been disappointing (the ECB allotted
82.6 billion euros on 18 September 2014, and the second tranche will be
announced on 9 December 2014 and allocated on 11 December). The continuing
deterioration of the macroeconomic environment will give investors reason to
hold their assets until the ECB’s policy goes even further. To achieve a trillion euro
expansion of its balance sheet, the ECB needs to move to the next step of the plan
set out by Mario Draghi in the Spring, i.e. “Broad-based asset purchases” (BBAP),
and to reach the target size, they should include purchases of sovereign bonds in
the euro zone.
In December 2014, the ECB has published its new economic forecasts,
including the first for up to 2017. It seems that early 2015 will be the earliest
occasion at which new monetary stimulus measures could be announced if the
economic outlook for the euro zone still shows no sign of improvement, or if fears
of a de-anchoring of inflation expectations gain more ground. In this case, there is
a good chance that the ECB will use unconventional monetary policy, as it sees fit,
10. Asset-backed securities: The key to unlocking Europe's credit markets?, by Carlo Altomonte and
Patrizia Bussoli, 24 July 2014.
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that is to say, the purchase of sovereign bonds, to try to prevent a further deterio-
ration in the economic outlook, which could lead to the break-up of the euro zone.
All in all, two main conclusions emerge from the study of ECB monetary
policies: First, the monetary programmes implemented by the ECB have
remained limited in scale, in contrast with other central banks like the Fed
and the Bank of England; second, monetary policy measures have not
produced an increase in bank loans, despite an improvement in the interest
rate channel; consequently, monetary policy measures have neither been
sufficient to produce a recovery in the euro zone nor to achieve the inflation
target at 2%. Fragmentation remains.
3. Banking Europe: In unity strength?
The banking union, which has been phased in from November 2014, is
part of a slow process of European financial integration. The premises of a
banking and financial Europe already figure in the Treaty of Rome (1957). In
addition to the free movement of goods, the Treaty provided for the freedoms of
establishment, of the provision of services and of the movement of people and
capital (Article 67). These fundamental freedoms provided fertile ground for the
emergence of a European banking and financial market. It was nevertheless not
until the Single European Act in 1986, followed by the 1988 Directive, that
Article 67 came into force, on 1 July 1990. Meanwhile, in 1974, the Basel
Committee defined the basis for international prudential banking regulations,
which were gradually adopted at the European level with the Basel I standards in
1988 (some countries), Basel II in 2004 (standard adopted in the form of an EU
directive) and then Basel III in 2010 (adoption of a European directive and a
European regulation with implementation starting on 1 January 2014).
A fruit of the crisis, the banking union is organized around three pillars. It
harmonizes supervision (and thereby abolishes unnecessary opportunities for
regulatory arbitrage), creates bank resolution mechanisms in the euro zone and
adopts the logic of a “bail-in” of the banks. In this sense, it offers new solutions.
However, it leaves grey areas, and the European solidarity created by the
banking union could be insufficient to deal with major shocks. A specific
banking fund may thus be needed.
The banking union: A solution with three pillars
At the EU summit in June 2012, the heads of State announced plans to create
a European banking union. The idea of the banking union was born from a
threefold need: to break the link between the sovereign debt crisis and the
banking crisis by creating a Single Resolution Fund and at an ultimate stage by
allowing the direct recapitalization of troubled banks by the European Stability
Mechanism;11 to prevent runs on banks; and to avoid the fragmentation of the
euro zone’s banking markets.
11. In this ultimate case, the approval of national parliaments may be necessary. For instance,
according to the decision of the German parliament on 6 November 2014, the approval to ESM
funds for direct recapitalization are currently limited up to an amount of 60 bn. euros, while the
Single Resolution Fund shall have a total volume of 55 bn. euros in 2023.
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Pillar 1
The first pillar is the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM): its implementation
is based on three texts.12 The Regulation of 3 November 2013 entrusts prudential
supervision of the banking system to the European Central Bank as of 4 November
2014. Article 6 of the Regulation states that the nature of this supervision depends
on the size of the bank, its importance to the economy of the participating State,
and the scale of its cross-border activities. The following are therefore
distinguished:
• “Important” banks, directly supervised by the ECB
Institutions considered “important” are those that comply with at least one of
these four conditions: 1) hold total assets exceeding 30 billion euros; 2) hold total
assets of over 20% of the Member State's GDP; 3) are considered significant by
the competent national authority; or 4) are considered significant by cross-border
activity.13
Regardless of these criteria, the SSM will cover at least three banks per country
and those that have claimed or received direct financial assistance through the
EFSF or the ESM. 130 banking groups throughout the euro zone will be affected,
i.e. almost 85% of all banking assets in the euro zone, but in different proportions
in different countries.
• The “less important” banks are those whose supervision continues to be
ensured by the national authorities, but under the control and within the
framework defined by the ECB.
Banks that do not meet the above criteria will still come under the supervision
of their respective national supervisors; they may be subjected to the direct
responsibility of the ECB if their situation deteriorates and if warranted by the risks
that they could pose to financial stability.
In order to have a good estimate of the state of health of Europe’s banking
system, in late 2013 the ECB joined with the European Banking Authority (EBA) to
initiate stress tests and an asset quality review (AQR). The results were published
on 26 October 2014. The stress tests are designed to assess the resilience of banks
in the event of a major crisis (recession with a 1.7% fall in Europe’s GDP, rising
interest rates, falling property prices, etc.). The AQR aims to verify the quality of
internal valuations of risky assets. These internal valuations play a key role since
they are used to calculate risk-weighted assets (RWA). The equity ratio (as defined
in Common Equity Tier 1, called CET114) divided by the RWA then defines the
Basel risk-based capital ratio, one of the solvency ratios used in the new Basel 3
prudential regulations. As of 2015, this must be greater than 4.5%. Basel 3 also
provides for adding a capital conservation buffer.15 By 2019 this capital must
represent at least 2.5% of the RWA, and the sum of Common Tier 1 and conserva-
12. The Agreement of 6 November 2013; Regulation No 1022/2013 establishing a European
supervisory authority (European Banking Authority); and Regulation No 1024/2013 of 15 October
2013 giving the ECB specific tasks on policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit
institutions.
13. At least, this includes banks whose cross-border assets or liabilities make up a significant part
(>10%) of its total assets or liabilities.
14. Equity capital according to CET1 criteria consist of common shares, retained earnings, and a
portion of the minority interests of bank subsidiaries.
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tion buffer capital must be above 7% by 2019.16 For its evaluation exercise, the
ECB has retained a minimum threshold of 5.5% in the stress scenario and 8% in
the baseline scenario. On this basis, only 25 of the 130 banks evaluated had a lack
of equity capital. A total recapitalization on the order of 25 billion euros is thus
necessary. This mainly concerned banks from the peripheral countries: Cyprus
(Bank of Cyprus), Greece (Hellenic Bank, National Bank of Greece, Eurobank), Italy
(Banco Popolare, Banca Popolare di Milano, Banca Popolare di Vicenza, Monte dei
Paschi di Siena, Banca Carrige, etc.) and Portugal (Banco Comercial Portugues).
Twelve banks have in fact already carried out capital increases since 1 January
2014, so only thirteen banks need to increase their capital. These seemingly
good results for the health check on Europe’s banks mean that the ECB can
begin its new single supervisor mission in serenity. There have nevertheless
been a number of criticisms of its method of assessing bank fragility, through
stress tests, so Europe’s optimism should be taken with caution.
Indeed, there are pros and cons to bank stress tests. Among the pros, Petrella
and Resti (2013) show that empirically the stress tests, corrected for the economic
environment in which they were made public, had the expected market effects.
They support the argument that the publication of these results constitutes infor-
mation that is likely to influence the price of bank stocks. Schuermann (2014) also
justifies the bank stress tests based on their ability to generate a return of confi-
dence in the banks. Among the cons, Borio et al. (2014) point out the several
shortcomings of these tests. First, they are based on a partial equilibrium
approach that does not take into account the feedback effects of bank fragility on
macroeconomic risks (also see Galati and Moessner, 2013). The risks estimated are
only due to the first round effects of strictly exogenous shocks. Second, the under-
lying econometric model is linear, which is contradictory to the goal of the stress
tests, which is precisely to detect a breakdown in banks’ balance sheets following
a macroeconomic shock. Third, the stress test models are “the antithesis of what
financial instability corresponds to” (Borio et al., 2014). Financial instability is not
set off after a major macroeconomic shock (a 1.7% fall in euro zone GDP!), but
after a “normal” shock, that is to say, a small-scale shock. If GDP tumbles 1.7%,
and the financial system is swept away in the storm, it cannot be concluded that
the financial system was already fragile. Conversely, if there is only a small shake
then it is easier to blame the fragility of the financial system if it fails to withstand
this. Fourth, financial and banking crises are not normally triggered after GDP
falls, but before it has substantially declined. 
Pillar 2
The second pillar provides a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), which is to
handle the resolution of bank failures. It is based on two Community texts17 and
an Inter-Governmental Agreement of the Council of the European Union (21 May
2014) covering certain specific aspects of the establishment of a Resolution Fund.
15. This capital could consist of a compulsory retention from earnings when the solvency ratio is
insufficient. 
16. The total Basel risk-based capital ratio can significantly exceed that number, if, depending on
the institute and economic activity, systemic or countercyclical buffers are activated by the
regulatory authorities. However, postponing the introduction of an obligatory absolute leverage-
ratio in addition to the risk-weighted approach until 2016 has been criticized.  
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A Single Resolution Board will be created and will decide, centrally, to recapitalize
an institution or to liquidate it. The regulation establishing the SRM (No. 806/
2014) governs the creation of the Single Resolution Fund and its compartments,
as well as the conditions for deciding on its use, while the Inter-Governmental
Agreement deals with the transfer of national funds into the Single Resolution
Fund and on proceeding with the mutualization of its compartments. The SRM
will apply only to banks participating in the SSM.
First, the principle of “bail-in” is enacted as follows: starting in January 2015,
the EU Recovery and resolution of banks Directive is to come into effect, which
provides, when a bank is in difficulty, a “bail-in” of the bank, rather than an
external “bail-out” by the government. The first to pay would be the shareholders
and creditors in order of seniority – bondholders, then depositors whose deposits
exceed 100.000 euros. The bail-in will apply to at least 8% of the bank's liabilities
before the Single Resolution Fund can be used. As a rule, the Fund may not recap-
italize more than 5% of the bank’s liabilities.
Second, unlike the rest of the resolution mechanism, which is Community
level, the establishment of the resolution fund will be based on the Inter-Govern-
mental Agreement. After a period of eight years (2016-2023), the Fund, which
will be funded by the banks, will have 55 billion euros and be mutualized.18 The
pooling of these funds will take place gradually, with 40% of funds to be shared
during the first year, 60% the second year, and the rest being included progres-
sively over the following six years.
Pillar 3
The third pillar is to harmonize the already existing national deposit guarantee
schemes. Directive 2014/59/EU19 on the strengthening of deposit guarantee
mechanisms reaffirms the protection of guarantees on deposits of up to 100,000
euros. It provides, after a transition period of 10 years, quicker reimbursement
(7 days) in the event of a bank failure and more solid financing for national
guarantee mechanisms (0.8% of deposits covered against about 0.1% in France
in 2014) via a tax levy on banks.
Numerous grey areas
While many experts agree that the banking union is a big step in “deepening”
European integration, a number of grey areas undoubtedly remain. First, the
process of unifying the banking systems will be slow. The mutualization estab-
lished in the second and third pillars will take place later. If a State’s banks need to
be bailed out during the transition period, then it is the State in question that
would continue to borrow in its own name from the ESM. Furthermore, the
17. Directive 2014/59/EU of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the resolution and recovery
of credit institutions and investment firms, and Regulation 806/2014 of 15 July 2014 on the Single
Resolution Mechanism, which essentially governs how the mechanism functions.
18. The agreement provides that, upon a plenary decision of the Resolution Board, the Fund may
borrow on the financial markets to strengthen its capacity for intervention. The target amount is also
raised to at least 1% of all covered bank deposits at the end of the transition period (2016-2013).
19. Directive 2014/49/EU on deposit guarantee schemes was published in the OJEU on 12 June
2014; it must be transposed by the Member States before 31 May 2016.
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methods for the transfer and mutualization of contributions to the Single Resolu-
tion Fund (second pillar) are based on an intergovernmental treaty, potentially
giving countries a veto.
The fragmentation of banking between countries is likely to increase, for
three reasons. First, because, as Basel 3 comes on line, banks, especially in
troubled countries, will be subject to more stringent requirements and so will
have to rein in their credit distribution and strengthen their liquidity with the ECB
(Couppey-Soubeyran et al., 2012). Second, while other countries, including
France, wanted all 6.000 banks in the euro zone to be subject to the ECB’s new
supervisory regulations, Germany managed for its regional banks (Sparkassen) to
avoid the ECB’s single supervision by making a distinction between major banks
and smaller banks. The argument put forward is that in the case of small regional
banks a central supervisor does not have any informational advantage over a local
supervisor (Quignon, 2013). Between 25% and 35% of the German banking
system is thus still directly supervised by the national authorities (against only 5%
for France, where the banking system is highly concentrated). Yet the small
regional banks may also pose a systemic risk (Speyer, 2012; Quignon, 2013), as is
evidenced by the difficulties Spain’s savings banks have encountered and the
resulting impact on the country’s banking system. There is a risk of fragmentation
between a well-capitalized conglomerate of big banks and a weakened periphery
of small undercapitalized banks. Third, the fragmentation will increase most, if
ever one of the Global Systemically Important Banks (GSIBs) has to go through
resolution at public expense of the member state, in which it is seated. These
interconnected institutes incorporate the largest part of the systemic risk. So far,
the too-important-to-fail (TITF) problem has not been addressed sufficiently
within the Banking Union. In particular, European megabanks still take benefits
from the implicit subsidy based on the fact that in case of difficulties a govern-
ment bail-out will be necessary to guarantee the stability of the financial system
(IMF 2014). If one of these banks has to be resoluted, the Single Resolution Fund
will not yet be large enough to provide 5% of the bank’s total liabilities (Lindner
et al., 2013). Indeed, this makes the TITF problem one of the central challenges
beyond the current state of the European Banking Union.
The shift from a bail-out to a bail-in logic is similar to a return to market disci-
pline where investors, being aware of a reduction in the State’s implicit support,
will demand higher returns based on the risk profile of the issuing bank. This
revaluation of bank risk may weigh on the banks' refinancing costs and the
allocation of credit to business.
The new financial products being purchased and issued by financial institu-
tions are spurring the emergence of a system of credit that parallels the traditional
banking system and avoids prudential regulation. This parallel system of “shadow
banking” facilitates access to liquidity, which could be beneficial to the financing
of the real economy, but it is also conducive to the development of leverage
effects that can in turn encourage speculative abuse. This parallel system is
ignored by the proposed banking union. In an ACPR note, D. Nouy (2013)
mentions several possibilities, including expanding the supervisor’s role, or sepa-
ration. However, the article warns against the risk of regulations that would lead
to reducing access to liquidity.
More specifically, on the issue of separation, the banking union will require
a broader harmonization of national regulations. Indeed, following the recom-
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mendations by Volker (2010), Vickers (2011) and Liikanen (2012), several
countries have adopted national measures on the separation of banking activities
aimed at securing deposits: the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Belgium.
These uncoordinated national choices are questionable and constitute a new
source of divergence. The adoption of common regulations for banks' financial
activities could be a fourth major pillar of the banking union (Antonin et al.,
2014). The separation advocated by the Barnier proposal lends credibility to the
banking union and its three pillars (SSM, SRM and deposit insurance). The estab-
lishment of a consistent framework simplifies the control of the European
supervisor within the SSM process (the ECB will check banks’ normal activities and
ensure that they are not disturbed by speculative activity) and reduces distortions
in competition. The separation advocated by the Barnier project also lends credi-
bility to the SRM, as it becomes more difficult for banks to attain systemic size
(too-big-to-fail), and losses by market banks will not be reflected (at least not
directly) in the lending activities of deposit banks. By reducing the risk that
commercial banks will fail, it reduces the risk that a costly bailout for savers (bail-
in) will be needed, such as activating the deposit guarantee.
There has been criticism of the attribution to the ECB of the single supervisor
mission. One argument holds that the process of supervision at the European level
should be as broad as possible, and ideally include all the economies of the
European Union (Pisani-Ferry et al., 2012; Barbu and Boitan, 2013). However, as
things exist today, single supervision via the ECB is required only for the euro
zone. It would have been more appropriate to expand the powers of the EBA.
However, the EBA’s credibility might have been tainted insofar as the stress tests it
published in July 2011 were imperfect predictors of banks’ real ability to withstand
the sovereign debt crisis in late 2011.
Speyer (2012) sets out six other factors that argue against attributing the
whole supervision mission to the ECB:
— A conflict in objectives: the ECB would combine the powers of monetary
policy and financial supervision. There may be conflicting objectives in
these mandates, such as a trade-off between price stability and the
strength of the banking system.
— The risk of credibility: if the ECB fails in its role as the single supervisor, this
could harm its reputation.
— The ECB is independent, and its mandate should be clear so that Parlia-
ment can easily hold it accountable for its actions. This new role of
supervisor could cloud the clarity of its mission.
— A broader and more political mandate increases the risk of political inter-
ference, weakening its independence. 
— The authority delegated to the EBA was more readily accepted because it
was subject to parliamentary control. The independence of the central
bank could be an obstacle to the exercise of the new powers.
— From a legal point of view, the decisions taken by a supervisor should be
disputable before another legal entity. The notion of the ECB's independ-
ence does not fit well with the possibility of appealing to another authority.
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However, these issues have to be weighed against the fact that at the current
stage of European integration, the ECB seems the only institution that can
effectively enforce an improvement in financial market stability. 
Towards a better mutualization of risk
The banking union represents an undeniable advance, as it should make
it possible to break the vicious circle between the banking crisis and the
sovereign debt crisis. Banks should be notably less exposed to public finances
weaknesses as was the case during the recent crisis. Cost of funding for banks
would then be reduced and become more homogeneous. Consequently, the
transmission of monetary policy could also become more homogeneous: if banks
are better integrated, their characteristics should converge, which will allow them
to apply more uniform rates on new loans and therefore better pass through the
key rate policy to market rates.
The success of the banking union depends on developing the activity of each
bank beyond its national market. The successful completion of the banking union
should be characterized by banks with a territorial coverage that is broad enough
to absorb asymmetric economic shocks. In this sense, the geographical diversifica-
tion of banks’ balance sheets could contribute to mutualizing asymmetric cyclical
shocks. By simplifying the bank-regulator relationship, the single supervisor
should help banks to expand beyond their domestic markets, which would
also contribute to better integration. Besides, by reducing the potential political
capture of the decision to save some banks, it would avoid to let non-performing
banks (or even Zombies banks) pursue activity, hence deteriorating the quality of
intermediate finance. The ensuing strength of the European banking system
would improve its stability. The harmonization in the procedure would also
reduce national heterogeneities across countries. It would then reduce costs of
funding and fragmentation across countries. It must yet be stressed that the reso-
lution procedure may still be complex, long and open to political dispute.
The crisis resolution fund and the deposit guarantee fund provide two addi-
tional ways to protect the banking system. To some extent, these two funds
constitute a mechanism for mutualizing asymmetric shocks in the euro zone,
which could contribute to further optimizing the currency area, in the sense of
Mundell (Quignon, 2013). In 2009, at the height of the banking crisis, govern-
ments had to commit significant public funds, up to a level of 9.1% of GDP. But
what would happen if ever these two funds proved insufficient in the future?
Would each State once again take responsibility for supporting its banking
sector? If some States proved unable to do this, then in order to prevent the
breakup of the euro zone, such a failure could require either greater fiscal union
via the ESM or that the ECB goes beyond its implicit role as lender of last resort,
which is theoretically limited to liquidity crises, and becomes the true saviour of
the euro by monetizing the losses. Large safety nets and appropriate backstop
(through the resolution fund) may help to prevent liquidity squeezes, increase
stability and reduce fragmentation across countries. Given the limited scope of
the single resolution fund and very progressive funding though, uncertainties will
remain strong on the ability of the banking union to be able to resolve timely a
systemic institution.
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Beyond the current stage of the European Banking Union
The success of the European Banking Union depends on two issues not
adequately addressed at the current stage. First, the implementation of an
effective backstop in addition to the existing resolution and deposit guarantee
funds, which could easily become overloaded in the case of the next systemic
turbulences. Under the status quo, national backstops which have not been set up
effectively in all member states are still favoured and which carry the risk of once
again setting off the vicious circle between banks and states. Second, the problem
of too-important-to-fail (TITF) banks, which should be discussed in the light of a
comparison between Europe and the United States, as in both markets bank
concentration has increased due to the financial crisis. The amount of total assets
held by European megabanks even exceeds the one held by US megabanks, while
at the same time the absolute leverage ratio (see Footnote 15) of European GSIBs
is on average almost one percentage point lower than the one of American GSIBs
(Hoenig, 2014). In order not to place the budgets of the member states under
undue pressure and in order to address the TITF problem, Lindner et al. (2014)
propose a special sectorial fund instead of national backstop solutions. In the long
term, the biggest market participants’ contributions to this fund are expected to
be substantial such that it gives an incentive to reduce the size.20 
The fund would have to be financed by pan-European levy instead of national
ones. As the euro zone is an integrated financial market, solvent financial market
participants from other member states than the domestic, including non-banks
such as hedge funds and other shadow banks, should ultimately contribute to
pan-European financial market stability. While in principle constructed for cases in
which the Single Resolution Fund is undercapitalized, if necessary, the special
sectorial fund could also be used for the coordinated process in dealing with
banks for which the asset quality review and the stress test on 26 October 2014
have evaluated a lack of equity capital. As the results mainly concerned banks
from the peripheral countries, this could prevent a further fragmentation of the
banking system without creating budgetary consequences in the corresponding
member states. In order to be immediately operational a comprehensive direct
recapitalization by the ESM is needed, while the ESM receives claims against the
pan-European banking sector which must be repaid in a more long-term manner.
4. The ECB and the future
The activism of the ECB has raised at least four concerns about the risks it
may pose to the Euro zone in the long run. The first risk is inflation. The mone-
tarist view acknowledges that the growth of monetary aggregates will fuel
inflation. At the moment, such a risk is negligible: as discussed in chapter 1, the
euro zone is facing the risk of deflation, not inflation. The second risk induced by
the ECB is political: does quantitative easing bypass the mandate of the ECB,
notably when the latter is involved in buying public bonds? The answer to this
question will be given by the European Court of Justice in January 2015. Mean-
20. Both scenarios, asset sales or breaking apart into legally independent entities, are conceivable.
The contribution period has to be stretched in order not to place a strain on lending or on financial
market stability as a result of direct and high contribution payments. 
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while, one can say that the primary mandate of the ECB is to achieve price
stability. Drawing on this mandate, one might argue that quantitative easing is
aimed at increasing inflation expectations and inflation rates up to the level where
the inflation target will be reached. In this sense, QE would help the ECB to
achieve its objective. The third risk is one of excessive volatility in the euro/USD
exchange rate (ER) in an era of secular stagnation. The reasoning borrows from
the “overshooting” argument: the US tapering produces a differential in
monetary stances between the US and the euro zone. A long lasting expansionary
monetary policy in the euro zone, coupled with a restrictive policy in the US, may
generate a positive interest rate spread between the US and the euro zone, hence
an expected appreciation of the euro vis-à-vis the USD. Such an expectation
would require a sharp and sudden euro depreciation, hence volatility in the ER,
without a surge in long run growth. This argument can be used, nevertheless, to
argue that a sharp depreciation of the euro will foster economic growth in the
short run: the risk thus becomes an opportunity. Finally, there are concerns
whether the massive purchases of assets including sovereign bonds, by driving
down the returns on these comparatively safe assets, will inflate the prices of
other, riskier assets. This might even create bubbles whose subsequent bursting
might be difficult to control. Raising the prices of existing assets also has distribu-
tional implications that many will be uncomfortable with in the wake of the crisis
and given an already pronounced trend to greater inequality in many countries.
Of course measures could be taken to counter possible side effects such as these.
They do not invalidate quantitative easing. But they imply that careful policy
choices need to be made.
So far, the relative ineffectiveness of the ECB to foster growth and inflation
must be acknowledged: the ECB will not be able to reflate the euro zone on its
own. In the light of the previous analysis it should be considered to initiate a
time-limited policy of quantitative easing in Europe via, e.g. a pre-announced
and substantial volume of purchases by the European Central Bank of newly
created European Investment Bank bonds on the secondary market. The
funds are made available to euro zone member state governments for public
investment projects that meet certain minimal European guidelines and without a
co-financing requirement. A number of variations of the scheme can be envis-
aged, each with specific economic or political advantages and drawbacks. These
are discussed below; first we set out the basic mechanisms: 
• The scheme is established based on a decision by the European Council and
initially given a timescale of, say, five years that clearly establishes this form
of central bank support for public investment as reflecting a temporary
phenomenon necessitated by the risk of deflation and or stagnation and
the break-up of the currency union. Within this framework, the EIB emits
bonds on a degressive scale. Starting from an initial level – as a point of
departure we propose €250 bn in the first year, but the scheme is flexibly
scalable – the volume of bonds issued is progressively reduced (e.g. by €50
bn a year).  
• The ECB commits to purchasing these bonds on the secondary market and
holding them on its books for a holding period (for instance ten years). The
EIB triple A rating coupled with the preannounced central bank purchases
will ensure extremely low interest rates. In order to ensure conformity with
the ECB's Treaty obligation to ensure price stability – currently being
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infringed on the downside – a trigger mechanism can be incorporated: if
economic recovery is sufficiently strong that inflation rises above a certain
threshold, the ECB can progressively withdraw from the purchases (taper). 
• The EIB makes the funds generated by its bond placements available to
Member States for public investment purposes. The precise way resources
are allocated between Member States can be varied to meet different policy
aims and considerations of political feasibility (see below). The EIB is not
responsible for detailed vetting of proposals, as is the case with its normal
lending, (It normally performs extensive due diligence to secure its triple A
rating, but this is not required here since the bonds are held by the ECB).
Equally the usual requirement for 50% Member State co-financing is
waived. 
• Member States submit projects for funding that meet a small number of
European guidelines (e.g. conformity to the goals of the Europe 2020
strategy, climate-change commitments etc.). A starting point could be the
list in any case being drawn up for the Juncker Investment Plan. Some
funding could also be reserved for pan-European projects, although the
likely more extensive coordination demands involved risk implementation
delays.
• Member States conduct the projects with money being disbursed following
agreed milestones. Ultimately member State governments are responsible
to their electorates regarding the use of the money made available to them.
• After the agreed ECB holding period has expired the debt held by the ECB
is to be serviced. Here, too, different options are conceivable. It can, but it
needs not, be a feature of the scheme to extend the holding period indefi-
nitely; see the discussion below. 
Before looking at various specifications and options, it is worth noting some
important advantages of this approach in the current economic and political
context:
• A predetermined volume of additional real spending on goods and services
is reliably and predictably injected into the sluggish European economy,
raising real incomes and setting off multiplier and also anti-disinflationary
effects (cf. IMF 2014: 75ff.). This is in marked contrast to QE on purchasing
existing private or public sector assets: these do not of themselves create
additional real spending, but rather rely on indirect and uncertain channels
to increase spending, involve the vagaries of the financial sector and the
risks of inflating asset bubbles etc. 
• Government budgets are not burdened with additional debt for many years
by which time real and nominal incomes and thus debt servicing capacity
will be substantially higher. On the contrary, deficit and debt ratios will
decline due to the faster nominal GDP growth. This is in contrast to strate-
gies involving giving greater fiscal leeway to struggling economies: this
adds to their deficit and debt (although, depending on the multiplier, not
necessarily to the respective GDP ratios) and increases consolidation needs.
• Investment in areas crucial for Europe's future can be achieved, raising
productive capacity and productivity and crowding in private investment.
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There will be no crowding out because there will be no increase in interest
rates. There may be some upward pressure on inflation for a limited period
particularly if investment is also financed in low-unemployment countries
like Germany. However, higher inflation, especially in Germany, is a boon
not a bug of the scheme.  
• As an additional advantage shared with other QE schemes, the monetary
expansion will tend to cause depreciation of the euro, raising external
competitiveness.
• The scheme can be tailored in the light of political requirements.
Depending on program design, and if political obstacles can be overcome,
public investment spending can be concentrated in countries or regions
with the highest unemployment and largest negative output gaps. But if
there is no political support for such European-redistribution, the scheme
can go ahead on a “juste retour” basis, albeit with substantially reduced
effectiveness. 
• The scheme relies on already existent institutions and can be implemented
quickly. 
• The program is in principle infinitely scalable, as the ECB can “finance”
bond purchases with central bank money it creates at will, and it can be
progressively wound down as necessary and contingent on incoming infor-
mation about the state of the European economy. It is not mutually
exclusive to other measures on the monetary or fiscal side (and could be
rescaled accordingly).
• The scheme solves the problem of which assets the ECB should buy,
offering a market of unlimited size in principle and a security on which the
ECB faces no risk of capital losses (even if this is not economically, only
politically, important – see below). 
• The political effects for the process of European integration cannot be
quantified, but are likely to be substantial. The projects and their joint
funding would create a visible expression of a common European resolve to
exit the crisis and embark on a path of shared prosperity and ecological
modernisation. The Europe2020 Strategy would be given a substantial
boost, rather than, as now, a constant remainder of failure. The current risks
of political crisis (and secession) in some member states buckling under the
huge economic and social pressures would be reduced.
A number of alternatives and variations exist within this overall approach,
each with specific advantages and drawbacks. They relate, alongside the size and
duration of the scheme, to the role of the ECB in purchasing EIB bonds, the alloca-
tion of funds between member states, and to the debt servicing and repayment
options.
• Size and duration: As a point of departure a five year programme is
proposed with a degressive bond issue of €250 bn in the first year (2015),
falling by €50 bn each year. This represents roughly 2.5% of Euro Area GDP
in the first year falling by 0.5 p.p. each year. The aim is to boost spending
as fast as possible, but also to allow for the time needed to deploy resources
efficiently. It would take the programme to the end of the Europe 2020
strategy period. The total volume (€750 bn) represents some three-quarters
of the balance-sheet expansion apparently envisaged by the ECB. In the
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iAGS 2014 report capital investment needs of around €200 bn per year
were identified. In the Commission's AGS 2015 an investment gap of
between €230 and €370 bn is estimated. This is a serious understatement,
however, presumably designed to show the appropriateness of the Juncker
Investment Package: it is based on bringing the investment share back to
between 21 and 22% of GDP but “accepts” the heavily depressed level of
GDP as the benchmark for that calculation, and in any case ignores the
need for additional investment to meet agreed policy objectives. In the
light of these comparators the proposals seems appropriately dimensioned,
but it can be rescaled (and clearly would need to be smaller if it were
targeted on the countries which suffered the most from the crisis, rather
than being spread across the whole currency area). 
• Inflation target: In order to safeguard the independence of the ECB to
pursue its mandate there should be a provision for the ECB to gradually
wind down (taper) its purchases if economic conditions, and specifically the
inflation rate, warrant this. Here it is proposed that central bank purchases
would be wound down to zero over a six month period if the core inflation
rate in the euro area exceeds 2.5% for three consecutive months. The 2.5%
rate implies some limited overshooting, but this is more than justified given
the prolonged and substantial undershooting of the inflation target. In
order to avoid shocks to the financing process the EIB would continue to
issue bonds. This would be non-inflationary as private-sector liquidity
would be absorbed.
• Both fund disbursement and repayment can be designed in a number of
ways, whereby an underlying trade-off between political feasibility and
economic effectiveness needs to be borne in mind, reflecting the above-
mentioned heterogeneity within the Euro Area. At one extreme would be a
scheme in accordance with the principle “to each according to need, from
each according to means”. Funds would be made available primarily to the
countries in crisis on the basis of a combination of indicators such as the
unemployment rate, the output gap or per capita income. Debt servicing
and redemption (after the ECB holding period) would be “socialised”, e.g.
based on GDP weighting. The other extreme would be a voluntary scheme
based on a “juste retour” principle. Countries may claim the ECB-backed
EIB finance as they perceive their needs, and each country subsequently
services its nationally-specific debt to the ECB. The first extreme is clearly
politically infeasible, as the Eurobond/redemption fund debates have
shown. The latter would be ineffective as uptake is likely to be very limited.
Some middle way needs to be found that maximises the economic impact
while meeting political exigencies. One solution would be to distribute
investment funding on the basis of population. This would likely be
perceived as fair, although Germany would receive the largest absolute
disbursement. Even so, countries with higher financing costs and lower
incomes and prices – i.e. the “crisis countries” – would actually benefit most
in per capita terms. Repayment obligations could be entirely proportionate
to funds received, or various European solidarity components could, given
the political will to do so, be incorporated.
• A more radical proposal – although in fact it is much less so than it might
appear – would be to extend the central bank holding period to “for ever”,
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in essence removing the need for countries to repay the debt to the central
bank. In other words the public investment is financed by pure money crea-
tion (helicopter money). This may well be politically difficult to “sell”: it is
counterintuitive, but economically there is no reason not to adopt this
approach. The debt servicing payments constitute income for the ECB; at
the end of the year it transfers its profits back to its owners – ultimately the
taxpayers. As both the government and the central bank are public bodies
the monies paid essentially wander from the left to the right pocket of the
public-finance trousers. The debt might just as well be extinguished. There
is no real “loss” to the central bank in doing so. The only loss is higher infla-
tion; normally this is a serious concern, but not in the current context (see
Whelan 2014).
5. Conclusion
The euro area remains in a perilous situation, economically and politically. The
threat of break-up has not been averted. In a number of countries opposition
parties that are openly calling for exit and/or default are gaining in strength. 
It is conceivable that a mix of less restrictive national fiscal policy, the
European Investment Plan and aggressive quantitative easing by the ECB
might jolt the euro area economy out of stagnation. This is highly uncertain
however. First, this chapter has showed that monetary policies by the ECB
have not had a strong impact on growth, inflation and credit. Second, the
Juncker Plan (Investment Plan for Europe) which is supposed to mobilise at
least €315 bn in additional investment has important limitations. The Plan runs
for three years, so if fully realised the investment boost would amount to just over
1% of GDP each year. This would be welcome. However, the proposal is explicit
that very little additional public finance is being made available. Rather the
existing Structural and Investment Funds will be “fully exploited”. Member States
will be invited to commit funds, the incentive being that any such expenses will
not count against the fiscal deficit. The key issue is that the bulk of the funding is
supposed to come from private investors; the fund is highly leveraged. Given their
apparent reluctance to invest in the current economic environment, it has not
been made clear what the proposed scheme really changes in investors’ calcula-
tions to justify expectations of a substantial increase. Even if private investment
under the programme does take off, to what extent will it merely replace invest-
ment that was planned anyway (deadweight effect)? A previous and somewhat
similar scheme largely failed to generate a significant investment boost. All in all,
the scheme itself is unlikely to do harm – except for the risk that it might convince
policymakers that anywhere near enough has been done. It would be foolhardy to
expect the Plan to deliver a major boost to investment and output, however. 
In order to underpin recovery, public investment and progress towards
the Europe2020 goals, some form of public-investment-based QE financed by
ECB purchases, for a limited period, can be considered, of which one type has
been discussed in this chapter. As the literature cited above shows the view that
such policies are necessary is increasingly gaining ground in the policy debate.
The authorities should not leave it until it is too late. Another form of public policy
may also be considered, like a package that combines a pan-European carbon tax
with fiscal stimulus (see chapter 4).
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The chapter has also discussed about the grey areas of the banking
union and proposed a sectorial fund to escape a possible new wave of bail-
outs in the future.
